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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY-
A CURRENT SOCIO-LEGAL INVESTIGATION
GEORGE P SMITH, II*
Acnores autem morsus sunt intermissae libertatis quam retentae.
Freedom suppressed and again regained bites with keener fangs
than freedom never endangered.
Cicero, De Officus, ii. 7.24.
From the bushlands of Africa to the southlands of the Umted States,
the cry for "Freedom" is oftentimes heard in a harsh, resounding man-
ner. For the most part, the individuals who join in the chant have no
clear conception of the ultimate meaning of the word, Freedom. In-
stead, led by "pied pipers," seemingly endowed with charismatic quali-
ties, they follow blindly the paths marked by their leaders, oblivious to
the attendant responsibilities of possessing Freedom of any nature.
Freedom to live like other individuals under a democratic form of
government, freedom to be fully accepted into the social order, free-
dom to speak, freedom to publish and to be informed on all matters of
current news interest, freedom to practice any form of religion desired,
freedom to associate with individuals and groups of personal choice and
freedom to assemble in peaceable fashion to discuss matters of every
nature are the cuef value-oriented goals which serve as the bulwark
of the present "Freedom Movement."
It will be the purpose of this article to but assay the historical evolu-
tion of one freedom-the freedom or right of assembly-noting first its
development in England and later in America and finally its current
position in the twentieth century Even though the rights of free speech,
association, and religion are inescapably drawn into case discussions of
freedom of assembly, effort will be made to confine the consideration
to the pertinent assembly problems. In addition to considering the
fundamental legal propositions embodied in this right, as well as its
raison d' etre, thought and discussion will be given to the sociological
interpretations of the basic need for its recogmtion. But, before any of
this may be undertaken, an attempt to define in more exacting phil-
osophical terms what is meant by the word, "Freedom," must be made.
* Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor, State Umv. of New York at Buffalo. B.S.
Indiana (1961), J.D. (1964).
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THE CONCEPT OF "FREEDOM"
"Freedom" and "liberty" are two words used interchangeably in
modern thought and communication and, since the fourteenth cen-
tury, have been accepted as being substantially identical in their mean-
ing.' Although the English speaking world has tended in the past to treat
liberty as "something French, foolish and frivilous," and freedom as
"English, solid and sensible," it would appear, however, that there is
no ground for this thin distinction.2
Both negative, as well as positive, connotations have always been, and
will necessarily continue to be, associated with the concepts of freedom
and liberty-for, on one side is the acknowledged and guaranteed pro-
tection against the arbitrary exercise of powers by governmental bodies
and individuals, and on the other side is the basic enjoyment of funda-
mental rights which belong to all human beings. To lose sight of either
the negative or the positive connotation is to miss the substance and
the power of freedom.3
Freedom, said Alfred North Whitehead, means that within each type
of social character found in a state, co-ordination of aims should be
sought by that social unit in order that the general ends of the whole
community may be similarly attained without destruction of one or the
other. So, the very essence of freedom may be thought of as being
practicability of purpose.5 Bertrand Russell defines freedom, simply
as being, "the absence of obstacles to the realization of desires." " "Com-
plete freedom is thus only possible for omnipotence; practicable free-
dom is a matter of degree, dependent both upon external circumstances
and upon the nature of our desires." 7
This whole problem of freedom, then, should be viewed within the
context of culture." Innumerable factors are constantly interacting with-
in the phenomena which we commonly refer to as culture-the chief
factors being law and politics, industry and commerce, science and
1. Beard, Freedom in Political Thought, FREEDOM-ITs MEANING 288 (Anshen ed.
1942).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 289. See generally BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958).
4. Whitehead, Aspects of Freedom, FREEDOM-ITS MEANING 67 (Anshen ed. 1942).
5. Id. at 65.
6. Russell, Freedom and Government, FREEDOM-ITS MEANING 251 (Anshen ed. 1942).
7. Id.
8. Dewey, The Problem of Freedom, FREEDOM-ITs MEANING 374 (Anshen ed. 1942).
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technology, modes of communication, morals, and man's basic social
philosophy for justifying and criticizing conditions under which he
lives. Here again, the isolation of any one of these factors from the
total cultural context is fatal to achieving an understanding of the
entire complex itself.9
RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY IN ENGLAND
The right of assembly has, from an historical point of view, always
been closely connected with the right of free speech and the right of
petition.10 As early as 1215, with the signing of the Magna Charta, this
right of petition has been effectively recognized and used as a tool for
enabling individuals to seek redress for real or imagined wrongs com-
mitted against them."" But, Dicey, seeking to rigidly distinguish between
the right to petition and the right to assemble, has stated in very definite
terms that the English Constitution contains no such specific right of
public meeting or assembly. The right of assembly, then, is little more
than the end result of a judicial attitude which the courts have taken
regarding the individual's fundamental liberty of speech. There is,
furthermore, no special law of any kind which allows, A, B and C to
meet in the open air or elsewhere for a lawful purpose.' Dr. Dicey
9. Id.
See BaruxN, Two CoNcE Ts OF LIBERTY 57 (1958) where it is stated:
"The ideal of freedom to live as one wishes-and the pluralism of values connected
with it-is only the late fruit of our declining capitalist civilization: an ideal which
remote ages and primitive societies have not known, and one which posterity will
regard with curiosity, even sympathy, but with little comprehension."
10. FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF AssocIATioN 3 (1963).
11. Chapter 61 of the Magna Charta reads, in part:
"That if, we, our justiciary, our baliffs, or any of our officers, shall in any circum-
stances have failed in the performance of them toward any person, or shall have
broken through any of these articles of peace and security, and the offence be notified
to four barons chosen out of the five-and-twenty before mentioned, the said four barons
shall repair to us, our justiciary, if we are out of the realm, and laying open the
grievance, shall petition to have it redressed without delay."
See generally McKEcHNIE, THE MAGNA CHARTA 465-77, (1958).
12. DIcEY, INTRODUCriON TO THE STmy OF THE LAw OF TH CoNsTITTION 267 (1926);
Jarrett & Mund, The Right of Assembly, 9. N.Y.U.L.Q. 1, 2, 9, 10 (1931).
Dicey's whole general argument here, is severely criticized by fellow legal historians.
First of all, they note that while there is no particular statute granting English subjects
the right to assemble, this very concept of free assembly is a part of the unwritten
Constitution of England and, as such, a fundamental part of the law of the land.
Secondly, the pages of the history books all reveal that since time was recorded, men
have assembled and considered their act to be of inherent right. Dr. Stimson goes so
far as to state that "the right of assembly and petition is rather the original than a
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REV1EW [Vol. :9:359
does go on to note, however, that since A may go where he pleases, so
long as he commits no trespass, say what he wishes to B provided his
talk is not of a libelous or seditious nature; and, since B, C, etc., have
the same equal rights as A, both A, B, C and all -others may assemble
together in any place where otherwise they each have the right to be
for a lawful purpose and in a lawful manner.'3
In 1619, Lambard stated the basic common law attitude as regards
the act of assembly in England. 14 "An unlawful assembly is .of the
companie of three or more persons, disorderly coming together, forc-
ibly to commit an unlawful act, as to beat a man or to enter. upon his
possession or the like.".'5 In passing on a question of assembly, the
jurists usually found it necessary to consider both the intent and pur-
pose of those assembled and whether their behavior was such that it
terrorized the other people in the area who were not participating in
the assembly. 16
derivation from freedom of speech." Thirdly, the courts-during the comniM6n law
period-recognized and dealt with the right of assembly as a distinct right, .and not as
a hybrid. Finally, any cursory analysis of the English statutory law leads one to the
inescapable conclusion that the right of assembly was definitely recognized and made
the basis for many statutes which restricted and regulated its use. All things considered
equal, then, the legal historians conclude that the right of assembly is to' be regarded
as a distinct, separate and independent right. Goodhart, Public Meetings and Processions,
6 CAm. L. J. 161 (1937).
13. Id.; Beatty v. Gillbanks, 9 Q.B.D. 308 (1882).
At 501 of DIcEY, INTRODUCrION TO THE SWUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION, he presents the
current English position in re the components of an unlawful assembly and notes that
they are today substantially as they were in 1619.
"... any meeting of three or more persons who:
"(i) Assemble to commit, or, when assembled do commit, breach of the peace; or
"(ii) Assemble with intent to commit a crime by open force; or
"(iii) Assemble for any common purpose, whether lawful or unlawful, in such a
manner as to give firm and courageous persons in the neighborhood of the assembly
reasonable cause to fear, a breach of the peace, in consequnece of the assembly ... 
14. LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA, OR THE OFFICE OF THiE JUsTICEs OF PEACE 175, 176 (1619).
15. Id.
Lambard goes on to note that, "A Rout is a disorderly assembly of three or more
persons moving forward to commit by force an unlawful act. For it is a Rout, whether
they put their purpose in execution or no, if so be that they doe goe, ride, or moove
forward after their first meeting. And thus (upon the whole reckoning) an unlawful
assembly is the first degree or beginning; a Rout, the next step or proceeding; and a
riot the full effect and consumation of such a disordered and forbidden action"
16. Dicey's attitude, to recapitulate as well as to reiterate this point-see note 13
supra-would follow Lambard's position for the most part, and conclude that the
finding of an unlawful assembly would depend largely upon both the tenor of the times
as well as the number, manner, and place of meeting. The very ultimate test of the
character of an assembly, then, would seemingly be whether "the meeting does or does
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As early as 1361, the Justices of the Peace were allowed to order
individuals to enter into recognizances to keep the peace or simply to
be of good behavior.17 The very first English statute dealing exclusively
with unlawful assemblies, however, was that of 13 Henry IV, 1412,1s
later re-enforced by an Act of 2 Henry V, 1414..' During George I's
reign,20 a statute was passed entitled, "Act for preventing Tumults and
riotious Assemblies, and for the more speedy and effectual punishing
[of] the rioters." 21 In essence, the Act provided that if twelve or more
persons were unlawfully assembled they were to disperse within an
hour after the reading of a Proclamation,' or else be held guilty of a
felony.
Whether it was lawful in England to hold a meeting-regardless of
not contemplate the use of unlawful force, or does or does not inspire others with
reasonable fear that unlawful force will be used-i.e. that the King's peace will be
broken." Dzcy, supra note 12 at 501.
See note infra, and note the similarity of the American position with the English posi-
tion above as stated by Dicey.
17. Justices of the Peace Act, 34 Edw. 3, c. 1 (1361).
18. 13 Hen. IV c. 7, § 1 (1412).
The statute stated that: "If any riot, assembly, or rout of people, against the law
be made, the justices, three or two of them at the least, and the sheriff or the under-
sheriff, shall come with the power of the county if need be. And if the offenders be
departed before the coming of the said justices, and sheriff or undersheriff, the same
justices, three or two of them, shall diligently enquire within a month after such riot,
assembly or rout of people so made, and thereof shall hear and determine according to
the law of the land."
19. 2 Hen. V c. 8, § 2 (1414).
Perhaps the first comprehensive regulation of unlawful assemblies was accomplished
by the statutes of I Mary c. 12, (1553) and I Eliz. c. 16, (1558). These two statutes
enabled justices of the peace to disperse a group assembly if in their opinion it was,
or could well lead to an unlawful gathering.
20. 1714-727.
21. 1 Geo. 1, c. 5 § 2 (1715).
22. The Proclamation read:
"The King our Soveraigne Lord Chargeth and commandeth all persons being as-
sembled, immediately to disperse themselves, and peaceable to depart to their habita-
tions, or to their lawful business, upon the paines conteyned in the act lately made
against unlawful and rebellious asemblied. And God save the King." Id.
It is interesting to note that from this Act and Proclamation, we have acquired the
phrase, "reading the Riot Act."
Lord Coke was quick to note that: "... the King cannot create any offense by his
prohibition or proclamation which was not an offense before, for that was to change
the law, and to make an offense which was not; for ubi non est lex, ibi non est
transgressio; ergo, that which cannot be punished without proclamation cannot be
punished with it . ..For all indictments conclude contra legenz et consuetudinem
Angliae, or contra leges et statuta, etc. But never was seen any indictment to conclude
contra regiam problamationem." Proclamations, 12 Co. 74, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (1727).
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its orderly nature-on the public streets, remained to be decided by the
courts on a case by case basis. 23 Under the Highway Act of 1835, it was
settled that obstructions of the highways were unlawful;24 therefore,
every street assembly would constitute at least a technical obstruction.
But, there are no modem English decisions which hold clearly that it is
either prima facie lawful or unlawful to hold a meeting in the streets.2 6
A distinction should be made between public meetings or assemblies
and public processions. In the latter case, the public right of passage
is being exercised, with the number of people in the procession being
held immaterial so long as it avoids becoming a public nuisance, an un-
lawful assembly, a riot or general disorder in breach of the peace.28 But,
as alluded to earlier, the use of a highway for purposes other than
travel-as for example a public meeting-for which there is no specific
grant of statutory authority, is a legal wrong.29
Although a meeting held on a highway may be a trespass, so far as
the members of the local community are concerned the meeting or as-
sembly is an actionable offense only if it is a nuisance.30 The test of
whether there has been such a nuisance hinges on the degree of obstruc-
tion created on the highway."' It is no defense if there is sufficient
alternative passage space on the highway for the passers-by.32 In fact,
the mere placing of obstructions on either a public highway or street
in such a manner calculated to create an obstruction-even though no
person or automobile is actually prevented from free access-is an of-
23. Dicay, supra note 12 at 266-279.
24. 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, § 72.
25. Smith, J. in Homer v. Cadman, 54 L.T.R.(ns.) 421, 422 (Q.B. 1886).
26. Burden v. Rigler [1911] 1 K.B. 337, 340; Aldred v. Miller [1924] Sess. Gas. 117
(Ct. of Justiciary).
27. Goodhart, supra note 12 at 161. See also Dicry, supra note 22, appendix s. 2 (1),
E.C.S. Wade.
28. Goodhart, supra note 12 at 169.
29. McLean v. Crown Tailoring Co., [1913] 29 Ont. L.R. 455; Harrison v. Duke of
Rutland, [1893] 1 Q.B. 142, 154; Ex parte Lewis, [1888] 21 Q.B.D. 191, 197.
There may be an illegal obstruction of a highway although no person is actually
obstructed-Gill v. Cardon and Nield, [1917] 2 K.B. 674, Biggar v. Crowland, [1906]
13 Ont. L.R. 164-and even though the whole street is not obstructed. Greig v. Merritt,
[1913] 24 N.L.R. 328 (B.C.); Rex v. Fitzgerald, [1876] 39 U.C.Q.B. 297.
See Note, Riots, Routs and Unlawful Assemblies, 3 Am. L. MAG. 350 (1844); Stewart,
Public Speech and Public Order in Britain and the United States, 13 VAND. L. REv. 625
(1960); Hitchner, Freedom of Public Meetings in England since 1914, 36 Am. POL. Sc.
REv. 516 (1942).
30. Burden v. Rigler [1911] 1 K.B. 337.
31. Goodhart, supra note 12 at 169.
32. Id.
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fense.33 So it is, then, that any use whatsoever of a public highway, how-
ever reasonable and convenient to the general public it may be, is a
nuisance if it interferes with the basic right of passage.
3 4
Since there are no English cases which have considered the legality
of processions in depth, the English courts usually rely on the noted
Irish case of Lowdens v. Keaveney3 5 for their authority. While march-
ing down a street in Belfast, Ireland, Lowdens-who was a member of a
local band-played partisan tunes which attracted a crowd of over four
hundred people who in turn blocked both foot and vehicle traffic on
the street. The police authorities ordered the band to stop its march
but upon its refusal to comply, Lowdens was arrested and charged
with wilfully preventing and interrupting the free passage of persons as
well as carriages on a public street. The local Magistrate Court found
that Lowdens did in fact cause a material obstruction. On appeal, how-
ever, the Divisional Court held since the essential question whether the
procession was a reasonable one had not been considered, the conviction
by the lower court would be quashed.36 Consequently, it is seen, then,
that the right to hold a procession is not an absolute right, but instead
one which can only be exercised in a reasonable manner and for a law-
ful purpose.
As regards public meetings, it is now generally accepted that such
meetings or assemblies, if you will, can be safely held only with per-
mission of the police authorities. 7 Any reasonable apprehension on
the part of the policeman that obstructions to the free flow of traffic
or breaches of the peace will arise as a result of actual or anticipated
meetings is the decisive factor in determining whether or not the meet-
ing will be allowed 8
The public meeting or assembly is almost the sole method of expres-
sion of opinion for minority groups and others who are without the
33. Gill v. Carson and Nield, [1917] 2 K.B. 674.
34. Regina v. Train, [1862] 2 B. & S. 640.
See Homer v. Cadman, [1888] 16 Cox Clim. Cas. 51 where defendant who addressed
a crowd from a chair placed in the highway was convicted of wilfully obstructing the
free passage of the highway; De Morgan v. Metropolitan Board of Works, [1880] 5
Q.B.D. 155, 157 where it was held that the general public had no right to gather in
assemblies and hold meetings on a common; and Bailey v. Williamson, [1873] L.R. 8
Q.B. 118, where the court rejected the contention that there was a common law right
to hold public meetings in Hyde Park.
35. [1903] 2 I.R. 82.
36. Id. at 88.
37. Hancock, Public A'eetings-Police Powers, 18 CAN. B. REv. 649 (1940).
38. Duncan v. Jones [1936], 1 K.B. 218; Thomas v. Sawkins [19351, 2 K.B. 249.
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means of controlling or acquiring access to the press, the radio, and the
other medias of communication. When one considers the situation in
England today and the ill-defined standards of law enforcement to
govern the local police authorities, it is an inescapable conclusion that
earnest consideration should be given to a remedy which will clearly
define the police powers in this area and similarly lend stability to the
general framework of the laws.39 The criminal sedition laws provide
adequate protection for the state with respect to occurrences at public
meetings. Anticipatory control of public speech by police authorities0
is, therefore, a most regrettable and unfortunate limitation on the funda-
mental right of free assembly.
RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY IN THE UNITED STATES
While the right of assembly was formerly thought of in America as
being a by-product of the right of petition, it is now regarded as, "cog-
nate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.
) .41 The broad concept of a right of association, however, de-
veloped largely out of the right of assembly and in part out of due
process concepts.4 2 But, the American law regarding unlawful assem-
blies is, basically, but a modification of the English common law and
statute law.43
On October 14, 1774, the First Contintental Congress adopted what
was termed a "Declaration and Resolves." One of the basic propositions
asserted was that Americans "have a right peaceably to assemble, con-
sider their grievances and petition the King; and that all prosecutions,
prohibitory proclamations and commitments for the same are illegal." 44
The completed document drafted by the Federal Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787 did not include a Bill of Rights. Instead, it remained
for the First Congress meeting under the new Constitution in NeW York
on March 4, 1789, to consider and transmit to the states twelve amend-
39. See Hitchner, supra note 29 at 516 for a thorough consideration of the problems
of free assembly during the war years.
40. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876).
41. De Jonge v. Oregon, 288 U.S. 364-65 (1937).
42. FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHr OF ASSOCIATION 3 (1963). See generally
2 EmERsON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 759-805 (2d' ed.
1958).
43. ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 20 (1961). For a detailed
comparative study of the Right of Assembly in England and the United States see
Stewart, supra note 29 at 625. See generally KoNvrTz, FuNDAENAL LIBERTIES OF A
FREE PEOPLE (1957); and KoNvITz, THE CoNsTrTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1947).
44. Fellman, supra note 42 at 5, 6.
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ments for their approval or rejection. Ten of these amendments were
subsequently accepted by the states. The first amendment stated, "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging... the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of griev-
ances." So it was, then, that the right of assembly was first expressly
recognized by the federal government with the passage and adoption
of the first ten amendments to the Constitution. 45
The landmark United States Supreme Court decision dealing with
freedom of assembly is United States v. Cruikshank.4" Here, Cruikshank
and others were charged with a conspiracy, in violation of the En-
forcement Act of 1870, to prevent certain persons from assembling in
a peaceable manner. In holding the Act applicable only to deprivation
of national rights and not state rights, a majority of the court decided
that the general right to hold a lawful meeting was in the latter category.
however, and by way of dismissing the indictment, stated further that
if the people wished to protect their enjoyment of this right, they
should look to the states for this purpose. The First Amendment was
not intended to limit the action of state governments in respect to
their own citizens, but to operate upon the federal government alone
and prohibit Congress from abridging the right to assemble and peti-
tion.4 7 Today, a clause guaranteeing the rights of assembly and petition
are found in all fifty state constitutions or their equivalent.48
The case of Davis v. Massachusetts49 was, in all probability, the first to
reach the Supreme Court concerning the use of a public place for
speech making purposes. Here, an ordinance was held valid even though
it required the issuance of a permit by the Mayor of Boston before a
person could address a public assembly upon public property. The
High Court, however, reasoned that a muncipality, acting under a
valid grant of power from the state legislature, could-by its local law
making procedures-prohibit the use of its parks to public speakers unless
a proper permit was secured. "The right to absolutely exclude all rights
to use [public places] necessarily includes the authority [in the Mayor]
to determine under what circumstances such use may be availed of,
as the greater power contains the lesser." 50 The scope of the Davis
45. Id. at 6, 9. Jarrett & Mund, The Right of Assembly, 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. 10-12, (1931).
46. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
47. Id.
48. A complete survey of the various provisions made in the fifty State Constitutions
regarding freedom of assembly may be found in the Appendix to this article.
49. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
50. Id. at 48.
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case, has been, as of 1938, greatly restricted in its application with
Lovell v. City of Griffin5' and Hague v. C. 1. 0.52 being the principal
restricting influences.5
The Hague case,M involved the application of a city ordinance which
provided that no parades or public assemblies could be conducted "in
or upon the public streets, public parks or public buildings" of New
Jersey without a permit from the Director of Public Safety. The ordi-
nance provided further that permits would be refused only for pur-
poses of preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblages. The
petitioners asserted that they had been denied permits upon the pur-
ported grounds that they were communists and, as such, would create
a disorderly assembly. The truth of the matter was that they were
only concerned with the organization of unorganized workers into
labor unions for the purpose of achieving better working conditions
as spelled out in the National Labor Relations Act-.-The Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment-and particularly the due process clause-
did not create rights in the citizen of the United States but merely se-
cured existing rights against state abridgement. Regardless of this, the
Court went on to hold that the right to assemble and discuss topics and
to communicate respecting them, whether it be by word of mouth
or by pen, was a privilege inherent in the citizenship of the United
States.55
51. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
52. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
53. While restricting the scope of governmental power in this area, the Court has
never failed to recognize the power of the local authorities to exercise a reasonable
measure of control over the use to which its public places may be put. Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). What is reasonable depends upon a case by case analysis
of the problem.
ABERNATHY, supra note 43 at 54 states that the Davis Rule has been reversed in sub-
stance, if not in name, however.
54. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
55. There was a major difference of opinion by the Court in this case. Chief Justice
Hughes and Justices Black and Roberts concluded that the right to discuss the National
Labor Relations Act was a privilege of federal citizenship. Justice Stone explicitly
noted, however, that freedom of speech and of assembly did not fall within the protec-
tion of the privileges and immunities clause and that the record did not show that
a discussion of the N.L.R.B. Act was involved. He felt that the Civil Rights Act of
1871 permitted the suit because it challenged the very validity of the Jersey City
ordinance on Due Process grounds. Id. at 519, 525.
See Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), where an action was brought by mem-
bers of the Jehovah Witnesses to restrain enforcement of a municipal ordinance which
required the payment of a license tax for the privilege of distributing circulars on the
public streets and soliciting funds at the same time. The High Court expanded the
[Vol. 9:359
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In Cox v. New Hampshire," the Supreme Court unanimously sus-
tained a city ordinance which on its face granted even broader discre-
tion to administrative authorities than the New Jersey ordinance did in
the Hague case. 7  In this case, no parade, procession or assembly
upon a public street could be held unless a license was first obtained
from the town selectmen. The selectmen, then, had the absolute power
to investigate and decide the question of granting licenses. In sustaining
the validity of the ordinance Chief Justice Hughes stated the constitu-
tional guidelines to be applied in interpreting local ordinances of the
type which were before the court presently:
If a municipality has authority to control the use of its public
streets for parades or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it can-
not be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair dis-
crimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other
proper uses of the streets. We find it impossible to say that the
limited authority conferred by the licensing provisions of the
statute in question as thus construed by the state court contra-
vened any constitutional right.58
The decisions in Kunz v. New York50 and Niemotko v. Maryland0
state the general law as being that any arbitrary, unreasonable and
discriminatory power in a public officer to censor another's right to
speak and assemble in public places before the actual speech has begun,
Hague case, and seemed to follow Justice Stone's opinion in that case. For here,
it was held that the suit had been properly brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871
on the ground that the right to free speech was secured against state action by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Sellers v. Johnson, 69 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Iowa 1946); 163 F. 2d 877 (Sth Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 851 (1948) is a most interesting case involving issues of free
speech and assembly raised by a group of Jehovah Witnesses. This case involved the
attempt to peaceably transmit ideas of a controversial nature and is thus distinguishable
from those cases which turn upon an abuse or misuse of free speech and assembly.
See Note, 24 IND. L. J. 78 (1948).
In Thomas v. Collins, 307 U.S. 496 (1945) it was held that the right of unions to
hold public meetings vas protected against improper state interference by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As to legal problems arising in the labor area, see Nelles, The First American Labor
Cases, 41 YALE L. J. 165 (1931) and Affeldr, The Right of Association and Labor Law,
7 VU L.L. REv. 27 (1961).
56. 312 U.S. 569 (1944).
57. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
58. 312 U.S. 569, 571 (1944).
59. 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
60. 340 U.S. 268 (1951). Accord, In re Gribben, 50 Okla. 379, 47 Pac. 1074 (1897).
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will not be tolerated. If it reasonably appears, once the speaker begins
his speech to the assembly, that if he is allowed to continue public dis-
order will result, the speaker and the meeting may both be dispersedY'
It appears that the type of assembly that has caused the most diffi-
culty comes about usually on municipal streets. Mr. Justice Roberts in
Hague v. C. I. 0. 62 stated that street meetings must be accorded a
special kind of protection. "Wherever the title of streets and parks.
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,.
communicating thoughts between citizens and discussing public ques-
tions." 63 So it is seen that in ruling on the legality of a particular street
meetings, both time and place, as well as general circumstances, must
all be weighed carefully. At best, the judiciary can only endeavor to
decide on a case by case analysis, what is permissible or nonpermissible
for the occasion.4
The early cases of In re Frazee65 and Rich v. Naperville6 pointed
out very well the feeling of the times regarding any restrictions on
parades by use of local ordinance. ". . . Ever since the landing of the
Pilgrims from the Mayflower, the right to parade in a peaceable manner
and for a lawful purpose have been fostered and regarded as among the
fundamental rights of a free people. The spirit of our free institutions
allows great latitude in public parades and demonstrations whether
religious or political .. , 61 It is fairly well settled today, however,.
that licensing regulation of parades as well as processions by the local
government is a valid exercise of control-with the only real question
in each case being whether the "control is exerted so as not to deny or
unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for
61. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). Note the similarity here to that of the
English position at note 38, supra.
62. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
63. Id. at 515.
The American law follows the English Common Law in holding that any meeting
which appreciably obstructs a highway constitutes a nuisance. Thomas v. Casey, 121
N.J.L. 185, 1 A. 2d 866 (1938).
64. The most pervasive discouragement to meetings held in streets lies, then, in the
application of two basic types of municipal ordinances: those designed to prevent ob-
structions in the streets and those requiring a permit before street meetings. The
former is used as a basis for dispersal, and the latter customarily to prevent the gathering
of a crowd in the first place. ABERNATHY, THE RIGmHT oF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIAION
60 (1961).
65. 63 Mich. 396. 30 N.XV. 72 (1886).
66. 42 111. App. 222 (1891).
67. Id. at 224.
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the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions
immemorially associated with resort to public places." 68
Two classic examples of the current position or status of the right
,of assembly in the United States may be seen by a consideration of
Rockwell v. Morrist and Edwards v. South Carolina.70
In Rockwell, the Commissioner of Parks of New York City denied
-George Lincoln Rockwell, the self-described Commander of the Amer-
ican Nazi Party, a permit to use Union Square Park for the purposes of
holding a political meeting. The Commissioner sought to justify his
-denial of the permit by asserting that: the American Nazi Party was a
-subversive organization which advocated the overthrowal of the United
States government by force and violence; one of the recognized aims
'of the Party was the perpetration of racial genocide upon Jews; the
purpose of the proposed meeting was to advocate the aims of the Party
which would in turn, it was thought, ultimately result in general acts
of disorder, endangering the city's property as well as the welfare of its
residents; the applicant's prior course of conduct justified the conclusion
:that the applicant's deliberate intent was to provoke his listeners,
whether friendly or otherwise, to acts of violence. While the trial court
sustained the Commissioner's actions, the New York Appellate Court
reversed the lower court decision, without opinion, and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.71
68. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 562, 574 (1941). See generally Abernathy,
.supra note 64 to 83-107. o
In People v. Edelson, 169 Misc. 386, 7 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1938), the defendants
-were engaged in peaceful picketing of the petitioner's business-with the petitioner
'being involved in a local labor dispute. The police action, in attempting to clear a
,path through the picket line for a company foreman as well as three private detectives,
,created a disturbance which lasted from two to six minutes and resulted in the fore-
man's automobile being damaged and the foreman and the policemen being injured.
"The court held the defendants were not guilty of riot since the brief disturbance oc-
,curred during the course of picketing which was incidental to a labor dispute and,
further, because the governing statute did not apply to such actions of a mere incidental
nature. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
It is interesting to observe that BURNS IND. ANN. SrAT. § 10-3304 (1956 Rpl.), in
defining a 2nob or riotous assemblage states: "Any collection of individuals five or
more in number assembled for the unlawful purpose of offering violence to the person
or property of anyone or for the purpose of exercising correctional powers or regula-
tive powers over any person or persons by violence and without lawful authority shall
be regarded and designated as a 'mob' or 'riotous assemblage."'
69. 26 Misc. 2d. 229, 208 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1960); 211 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1961); 10
N.Y.2d. 721, 177 NE. 2d 48 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
70. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
71. See cases cited supra note 69.
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It would seem that the appropriate objective of a licensing system
with respect to public assemblies should be to specify suitable times and
places and proscribe the manner under which the assemblies should be
conducted rather than determining, by rather arbitrary standards,
whether such assemblies are to be held at all.
In the 1963 case of Edwards v. South Carolina,72 one hundred and
eighty-seven petitioners, having been convicted by the magistrate's court
in Columbia, South Carolina, of the common law crime of breach of
the peace and which conviction was affirmed by the South Carolina
Supreme Court, sought to have the United States Supreme Court pass
on the constitutional validity of their conviction.
72. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). Accord, Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963). See also
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965). There, the defendant-a civil rights leader-
obtained official authorization to assemble and peacefully demonstrate opposite a court-
house for the express purpose of protesting local policies which were felt aimed at
maintaining segregation. Upon a subsequent notification by the police that the demon-
stration had exceeded its time limits, and the protestors' failure to disperse, the defendant
was arrested and later convicted by the lower court on charges of a breach of peace and
an unlawful obstruction of public passages. The Supreme Court held that the con-
viction for breach of peace infringed upon defendant's right to assemble since his
conduct was not of a nature which the state could rightfully prohibit. Uncertainty of
the offense made the statute which created it, in turn, "unconstitutionally broad in
scope." As to the conviction for unlawful obstruction of public passages, the Court
found that-since the local authorities involved had complete discretion in permitting
or for prohibiting street meetings-this conviction was an unwarranted infringement
of the defendant's right to assemble.
But see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) where the convictions of thirty-tvo
college students were sustained by the High Court for trespass which grew out of a
march to a local jail where they assembled on the driveway as well as other parts of
the premises and-in a peaceful and orderly manner, yet blocking the flow of vehicular
traffic-sang various songs to protest not only local segregation policies but previous
arrests of other students. In holding as it did that the application of a rather narrow
state trespass statute to civil right demonstrators did not unconstitutionally act to de-
prive them of their rights to assemble or to petition for a redress of grievances, the
Court would appear to be taking what might be thought of as an "about face" in its
posture regarding the First Amendment. To be remembered, however, is the fact that
moments of lucidity for the Court pass quickly. A return to its previous unduly
liberal position concerning the First Amendment may be shortly expected.
In all fairness to the Court, it should be noted, however, that in Adderley, it was
considering a "workable" and tightly drawn statute. No arbitrary, capricious, or dis-
criminating provisions were found. The means employed to effectuate the purpose
of the statute, itself, were found to be reasonable. Thus, in situations where legislative
draftsmen have drawn a statute with care so as not to infringe upon Constitutional
guarantees, it is within the realm of possibility to hope a "moment of lucidity" will
lengthen and the Court will continue to uphold the validity of statutes within this
present area of concern and not be forced, because of vagueness of purpose as in Cox,
to strike complete statutory enactments thereby widening an already expanding area
of civil liberties.
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On the morning of March 2, 1961, the petitioners-who were colored
high school and college students-met at a church in Columbia and
walked in separate groups of about fifteen to the. South Carolina State
House grounds arriving as such around noon. The purpose of the
march was to register their protest of present state discriminatory poli-
cies against Negroes to the South Carolina legislature as well as to the
white citizens of the community itself. They carried placards bearing
such messages as, "I Am Proud To Be A Negro," and "Down With
Segregation," and were informed by the law enforcement officers pres-
ent on the grounds that their demonstration would be allowed so long
as it remained of a peaceful nature. A crowd of between two and
three hundred onlookers gathered in and- around the State House
grounds where the marching took place. The Chief of Police testified
that he recognized certain "trouble-makers" in the crowd and was on
his guard for outbursts of trouble at any time. There were no material
obstructions of either pedestrian or vehicular traffic within or about
the .immediate grounds of the State House, however.
After the demonstration had lasted about an hour, the police authori-
ties informed the marchers that if they did not disperse within fifteen
minutes, they would be arrested. Upon learning of this ultimatum, the
actions of the Negro group became "boisterous,". "loud" and "flam-
boyant." A type of "religious harangue" was given by one of the Negro
leaders-after which proceeded the singing of songs, the clapping of
hands, and the stomping of feet. One of the typical songs sung was, "I
Shall Not Be Moved." The general crowd increased to around five
hundred, and within fifteen minutes police officers moved in and began
to arrest the group participants. Convictions for violation of the statute 3
ranged from sentences of a ten dollar fine or five days in jail to a one
hundred dollar fine or thirty days in jail.
The Supreme Court held that the determination made by the South
73. "In general terms, a breach of the peace is a violation of public order, a disturbance
of the public tranquility, by any act or conduct inciting to violence . . ., it includes any
violation of any law enacted to preserve peace and good order. It may consist of an
act of violence or an act likely to produce violence. It is not necessary that the peace
be actually broken to lay the foundation for a prosecution for this offense. If what
is done is unjustifiable and unlawful, tending with sufficient directness to break the
peace, no more is required. Nor is actual personal violence an essential element in the
offense ....
"By 'peace,' as used in the law in this connection, it means the tranquility enjoyed
by citizens of a municipality or community where good order reigns among its mem-
bers, which is the natural right of all persons in political society." 372 U.S. 229, 236
(1963).
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Carolina court regarding the petitioner's conduct as constituting a
breach of peace under state law was binding upon it to that extent.
But, however, upon an independent examination of the complete record,
the High Court found that South Carolina's actions infringed "the
petitioners constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free as-
sembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances." -4
Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, noted that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not allow a state to make criminal the peaceful ex-
pression of unpopular views. He went on to say that the opportunity
for free political discussion in order to thereby insure that the govern-
ment remain responsive to the will of the people was a fundamental
principle of the United States Constitutional system."8
Mr. Justice Clark, in the only dissent of the case,7" stated first off his
difficulty in understanding the Court's understatement of the facts of
the case and its reversal of the conviction, especially in light of the very
fact that the state court's finding regarding petitioners' conduct as con-
stituting a breach of the peace was held as binding. He then proceeded
to note that the City Manager of Columbia testified that "a dangerous
situation was really building up," and that all the facts considered
tended to indicate that a public disorder was in the making. He con-
cluded by saying that when a case like the one presently before the
court existed, the power of the state to prevent or punish for clear
and present dangers of riot, disorder, or other immediate threats to
public safety should always be recognized."
The Edwards case, thus, points up the fact that the present Supreme
Court will go to great lengths in order to prevent any encroachment of
the fundamental rights of free assembly and free speech made under the
guise of a "lawful" exercise of state police powers.
SOCIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Order, viewed from the standpoint of sociology, has its roots not in
a universal law of nature, nor in the establishment of a form of recog-
nized external authority; but instead, in the very social experience of
the individual himself.78 Society is orderly because men learn to live
their lives in, and according to, an orderly process. This process re-
74. 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 239.
77. Id. at 243.
78. LANDIS, SOCIAL CONnOL 24-34 (1939). See generally Benoit-Smullyan, Status,
Status Types, and Status Interrelations, 9 AM. Soc. REv. 151 (1944).
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mains stable only so long as movements-whether of a social, political,
economical or religious nature-do not arise.79 Once such a movement
does in fact arise, and throws the present social system out of gear, a
new system evolves from the habit patterns of the individuals compris-
ing the movement and thus forms a new society.s0 It appears, from
the sociologist's view, that social order is built on the nature of man,
and not on a legal framework of laws which man himself has ef-
fectuated."'
Maintenance of a proper balance between individual freedom and
social control is, quite naturally, of great concern in any society. Too
much discipline tends to suppress individuality and breed revolt, smother
initiative and make for cultural stagnation. On the other hand, too much
freedom foreshadows personal degeneration, hastens cultural decline and
generally produces social chaos.82 Because of individual differences,
no established system of regulation can be equally pleasing to all; for
some, the best designed regulations will always appear coercive.8 3
There are five main types of events which prompt assemblies of
collective behavior: 1) The panic response; 2) The craze response,
fashion cycle, the fad, financial boom, the bandwagon, and the religious
revival; 3) The hostile outburst; 4) The norm oriented movement in-
cluding the social reform movement; and 5) The value oriented move-
ment including the political and religious revolution, the formation of
sects, the nationalist movement, etc. 4
Collective behavior-that element so vitally necessary to energize an
assembly-may be simply defined as a form of uninstitutionalized mobil-
ization for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strains s5
Strain or pressure, in some form or other, may be thought of as the
prime mover for collective behavior which in turn ultimately culminates
in an assembly or movement.
79. Id. See generally Anderson, Sociological Elements in Economic Restrictionim,
9 Am. Soc. Rv. 345 (1944).
80. Id.
81. Id. -
82. Landis, supra note 78 at 146.
83. Id.
84. SMELZER, THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 48 (1963). Dr. Clark Kerr, former
Chancelor of the University of California at Berkeley observed that, "The sit-in will
gradually join the coonskin coat as an interesting symbol of a student age retreating into
history." N.Y. Times, April 2, 1967, Sec. E, at 5, cols. 6, 7.
For an in-depth consideration of student rights set within the college background
see a symposium entitled, Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1966).
85. SMELZFR, supra note 84 at 71.
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That technological advancements are a recognized cause of social
change is indicated by various expressions heard quite often-"gun-
powder destroyed feudalism", "railroads created cities", "the steam
engine increased divorce," "the automobile is moving the department
store and the supermarket to suburbs," and "the airplane re-ranked the
great military powers." 86 "Automation," that word which strikes im-
mediate fear and gives rise to a sense of utter frustration in most of
the minds of the unskilled labor divisions, is obviously a chief source
of strain or pressure in the twentieth century.
The acceleration of atomic technologies and the precarious balance
of power among the world powers has caused still another pressure to
manifest itself in present daily life. Perhaps the dominant pressure of
our day can be seen in the Negro's new-found, and for the most part
totally unrealized, demand for "freedom." Not only is the Negro under
much strain in his confused search for Civil Rights, but his white
brethren are equally at odds with one another in trying to fathom the
situation.
Automation, exploration of the atom, and the emerging concept of
Civil Rights all find a form of permanency of expression in group move-
ments which, of necessity, rely in large part on open assemblies for their
full effectiveness. Sociology recognizes these occurrences of collective
behavior as mere responses to the social needs of man and, as such, vital
to his well being and stability. Discipline of some form must be exerted
in the regulation of collective behavior. With the method of discipline
employed must also go an awareness of the fact that its effect will be of
secondary nature to the social interactions of the group itself.
CONCLUSION
A definite conclusion, as such, is indeed most difficult to set out. This
is so, simply because the concept of Freedom of Assembly is still being
developed and structured by the courts on a case to case basis. Since the
purpose of this article was but to assay the development of the Right of
Assembly, a general concluding statement may nonetheless be made.
In this, an age of turbulence and crisis, both on the domestic and for-
eign scene, it is vitally important that groups-and particularly minority
groups-have a complete opportunity, within the scope of the laws, to
assemble and present their views on current patterns of interest. Even
though the Right of Assembly is recognized today in the United States
86. ALLEN, rECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 12 (1957); 9 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL Soc. 11-28.
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as a fundamental right, it nonetheless-of necessity-has certain restric-
tions placed upon its daily operation. The protection of the public peace
must be carefully reconciled with the conflicting interests of allowing
free expression of ideas in public places.8 7 A reconciliation of these two
interests, made reasonably and without arbitrary discrimination, is the
norm which the courts try to effectuate.
APPENDIX
The following are the pertinent sections of the Constitutions of the
fifty states concerning the Right of Assembly-
ALASKA: Art. I, § 6. The right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government shall never be abridged.
ALABAMA: Art. 1, § 25. That the citizens have a right, in a peaceable
manner, to assemble together for the common good, and to apply to
those invested with the power of government for redress or grievance
or other purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.
ARIZONA: H. D. 61st Cong., 3rd Sess., Art. 2, § 5. The right -of
petition, and of the people peaceably to assemble for the common good,
shall never be abridged.
87. "Although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not
in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction, if the particular re-
striction proposed is required in order to protect the State from destruction or from
injuries, political, economic or moral ....
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a
means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that with-
out free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that
the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American Government.
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew
that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that
it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repres-
sion; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the
power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of
governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so the free speech and assembly
should be guaranteed." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J. concurring).
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ARKANSAS: Art. 2, § 4. The right of the people peaceably to assemble,
to consult for a common good, and to petition, by address or remon-
strance, the government, or any department thereof, shall never be
abridged.
CALIFORNIA: Art. 1, § 10. The people shall have the right to freely
assemble together to consult for the common good, to instruct their
representatives, and to petition the Legislature for redress of grievances.
COLORADO: Art. II, § 24. That the people have the right peaceably to
assemble for the common good, and to apply to those invested with the
powers of government for redress of grievances, by petition or remon-
strance.
CONNEGcrlcu'r: Art. 1, § 16. The citizens have a right in a peaceable
manner, to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those
invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or
other purposes, by petition, address, or remonstrance.
DELAWARE: Art. 1, § 16 ... the citizens have a right in an orderly
manner to meet together, and to apply to persons intrusted with the
powers of government, for redress of grievances or other proper pur-
poses, by petition, remonstrance or address.
FLORIDA: Declaration of Rights, § 15. The people shall have the right
to assemble together to consult for the common good, to instruct their
representatives, and to petition the legislature for redress of grievances.
GEORGIA: Art. 1, Par. 14. The people have the right to assemble
peaceably for their common good and to apply to those vested with
the powers of government, for redress of grievances, by petition or
remonstrance.
HAWAII: Art. 1, § 3. No law shall be enacted respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.
IDAHO: Art. 1, § 10. The people shall have the right to assemble in
a peaceable manner to consult for their common good; to instruct their
representatives; and to petition the legislature for a redress of grievances.
ILLINOIS: Art. II, § 17. The people have the right to assemble in a
peaceful manner to consult for the common good, to make known their
opinions to their representatives and to apply for redress of grievances.
INDIANA: Art. 1, § 31. No law shall restrain any of the inhabitants
of the state from assembling together, in a peaceable manner, to consult
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for their common good; nor from instructing their representatives; nor
from applying to the General Assembly for redress of grievances.
IowA: Art. 1, § 20. The people have the right to freely assemble
together to counsel for the common good; and to make known their
opinions to their representatives, and to petition for a redress of griev-
ances.
KANSAS: Bill of Rights, § 3. The people have the right to assemble
in a peaceful manner, to consult for their common good, ,to instruct
their representatives, and to petition the government, or any depart-
ment thereof, for the redress of grievances.
KENTUCKY: Bill of Rights, § 1. The rights of assembling together in
a peaceful manner for the common good, and of applying to those in-
vested with the power of government for redress of grievances or other
proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.
LOUISIANA: Bill of Rights, Art. 4. No laws shall be passed respecting
.. the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petitior the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances.
MAINE: Art. 1, § 15. The people have a right at all times in an orderly
and peaceful manner to assemble to consult upon the common good,
to give instructions to their representatives, and to request, of either
department of the government by petition or remonstrance, redress of
their wrongs and grievances.
MARYLAND: Declaration of Rights, Art. 13. That every man hath a
right to petition the legislature for the redress of grievances in a peaceful
and orderly manner.
MASSACHUSErrs: Declaration of Rights, Art. 19. The people have a
right, in an orderly and peaceful manner, to assemble to consult upon
the public good; give instructions to their representatives, and to re-
quest of the legislative body, by the way of addresses, petition, or
remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances
they suffer.
MICHIGAN: Art. 18, § 10. The people have the right peaceably to
assemble together to consult for the common good, to instruct their
representatives, and to petition the legislature for redress of grievances.
MINNESOTA: Art. 1, § 16. The enumeration of rights in this constitu-
tion shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by and
inherent in the people.
MississiPpi: Art. 3, § 11. The right of the people peacefully to as-
semble and petition the government on any subject shall never be im-
paired.
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MISSOURI: Art. 2, § 29. That the people have the right peaceably to
assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the
powers of government for redress of grievances, by petition or remon-
strance.
MONTANA: Art. III, § 26. The people shall have the right peacefully
to assemble for the common good, and to apply to those invested with
the powers of government for redress of grievances by petition or re-
monstrance.
NEBRASKA: Art. 1, § 19. The right of the people peacefully to as-
semble to consult for the common good and to petition the govern-
ment or any department thereof shall never be abridged.
NEVADA: Art. 1, § 10. The people shall have the right freely to as-
semble together to consult for the common good, to instruct their repre-
sentatives, and to petition the Legislature for redress of grievances.
NEW HAMPSHIRE: Art. 1, § 32. The people have a right, in an
orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble and consult upon the com-
mon good, give instructions to their representatives, and to request of
the legislative body, by way of petition or remonstrance, redress of the
wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer.
NEW JERSEY: Art. 1, § 18. The people have the right freely to
assemble together to consult for the common good, to make known
their opinions to their representatives, and to petition for redress of
grievances.
NEW MExIcO: H. D. 61st Cong., 3rd Sess., Art. 2, § 23. The enumera-
tion in this constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny,
impair or disparage others retained by the people.
NEW YORK: Art. 1, § 10. No law shall be passed, abridging the right
of the people peacefully to assemble and to petition the government, or
any department thereof.
NORTH CAROLINA: Art. 1, § 25. The people have a right to assemble
together to consult for their common good, to instruct their representa-
tives, and to apply to the Legislature for redress of grievances. But
secret societies are dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and should
not be tolerated.
NORTH DAKOTA: Art. 1, § 10. The citizens have a right, in a peaceable
manner, to assemble together for the common good, and to apply to
those invested with the powers of government for the redress of griev-
ances, or for other proper purposes, by petition, address or remon-
strance.
OHIO: Art. 1, § 3. The people have the right to assemble together,
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in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; to instruct
their representatives; and to petition the General Assembly for the
redress of grievances.
OKLAHOMA: Art. 11, § 3. The people have the right peaceably to
assemble for their own good, and to apply to those invested with the
powers of government for redress of grievances by petition, address or
remonstrance.
O GON: Art. 1, § 27. No law shall be passed, restraining any of the
inhabitants of the state from assembling together in a peaceful manner
to consult for their common good, nor from instructing their repre-
sentatives, nor from applying to the legislature for redress of grievances.
PENNsYIvANIA: Art. 1, § 20. The citizens have a right in a peaceable
manner to assemble together for their common good and to apply
to those invested with the powers of government for redress of griev-
ances or other proper purposes, by petition, address, or remonstrance.
RHODE ISLAND: Art. 1, § 21. The citizens have a right in a peaceable
manner to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those in-
vested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or
for other purposes, by petition, address, or remonstrance.
SOUTH CAROLINA: Art. 1, § 4. .. . or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble and to petition the Government or any department
thereof for a redress of grievances.
SOUTH DAKOTA: Art. VI, § 4. The right of petition, and of the people
peaceably to assemble to consult for the common good and make known
their opinions, shall never be abridged.
TENNESSEE: Art. 1, § 23. That the citizens have a right, in a peace-
able manner, to assemble together for their common good, to instruct
their representatives, and to apply to those invested with the powers
of government for redress of grievances or other proper purposes, by
addresses or remonstrances.
TEXAS: Art. 1, § 27. The citizens shall have the right, in a peaceable
manner, to assemble together for their common good, and to apply to
those invested with the power of government for redress of grievances
or other purposes by petition, address or remonstrance.
UTAH: Art. 1, § 1. . . . to assemble peaceably, protest against their
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances...
VERMONT: c. 1, Art. 20. That the people have a right to assemble
together to consult for their common good-to instruct their representa-
tives-and to apply to the Legislature for redress of grievances, by
address, petition or remonstrance.
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VIRGINIA: Art. 1, § 17. The Rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights
shall not be construed to limit other rights of the people not therein ex-
pressed.
WASHINGTON: Art. 1, § 4. The right of petition, and of the people
peaceably to assemble for the common good shall never be abridged.
WEST VIRGINIA: Art. III, § 16. The right of the people to assemble
in a peaceable manner, to consult for the common good, to instruct
their representatives, or to apply for redress of grievances, shall be
held inviolate.
WIScONSIN: Art. 1, § 4. The right of the people peaceably to as-
semble, to consult for the common good, and to petition the govern-
ment or any department thereof, shall never be abridged.
WYOMING: Art. 1, § 21. The right of petition, and of the people
peaceably to assemble to consult for the common good, and to make
known their opinions, shall never be denied or abridged.
